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Annexed"

OLIVIA SO COL, as Administratrix With the Will
etc., Appellant, v. LOU,IS KING, Respondent.
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"

[1] Appeal-Time to Appeal-Prescribed Period.-A 'lotice of,
appeal from a judgillent was filed ·too late where it was filed:
more than 120 days after date of entry of the judgment, and,
the fact that appt'llunt's lIIotior. to vacate the judgment and.
to enter a different judgmt:ut was not decided within 120 daye:
after entry of the jlldgnlent did not mark the beginning of all"
additional 30-day period within which she might file her DO.'
lice, since rule 3(b) of thf' Hules 011 Appeal permits Dotice'
to be tiled within 30 days after denial of the motion to vacate
or 120 days after entry of judgment, whichever ahall be less.
(2) ld.-Orders Appealable-Order on JdOtiOT. &or J)jjfereut Judg- '
ment.-An order of denial of a motion to vacate a judgment,j

[1] See 2 Cal.:nr. 391; 3 Am.Jnr. 139.
JdcK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 247~; [2] Appt' an", Enor, ~ 58; [3] Appeal and Error, l251j [4] Judgments,
1204.
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and enter a different one under Code Civ." Proc., 1663, is
appealable as a apeeial order after final 'udgment under § 963,
notwithstanding that the same ground! could be urged on an
appeal from the judgment.
[8] ld.-T'.me to Appeal-Appeal from Orclere.-A notbe of appeal from an order denying a moti"u to vacate a judgment
and enter a different one was timely and valiis where it was
filed within 60 days after denial of tbe motion.
('~ .Judgments -'- Opening and VacatiDg-Procedure.-There was
a auffieient complianee with the provisions of Code Civ. Proe.,
I 663a, requiring notice of intention to mOle for aD order
vaea~ a judgment to specify the time the motion would· be
made, and rule 3(b) of Rules on Appeal, requi.riDg the motion
to be made orany in vpen court within 60 days, ",here, in view
of the fact that the trial judge was temporarily on duty in
another county and it was not certain that he would be available to hear the motion, the parties, aubaequen'; tt the flling
of the notiee of intention, stipulated that they would dispense
with the oral presentation of the motion Idld would submit it
to the trial judge on points and authorities, and where, moreover, the motion was in fact submitted to the trial judge in the
stipulated manner.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying motion to va~
the judgment. Ben V. Curler, Judge.- Appeal from judg.
ment dismissed on motion. Motion to ditml i 88 appeal from
order denied.
Porter O. Blackburn and Shelby Lee Chambers for Appellant.
Chas. T. Rippy for Respondent.

TRAYNOR, J.-Respondent moves to dimillll plaintiffs'
appeals from a judgment of the superior court and from an
order denying their motion to vacate the judgment and enter
a new and different judgment under section 663 of the Code
of Oivil Procedure.
.A.ll of the following events took place in 1948. Judgment
was entered in the trial court on April 28th. Notice of entry
was filed by respondents on May 8th and by appellants on
May 24th. On May 17th, appellants filed notice of intention
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to move for an order vacating the judgment and entering a
new and different judgment under subdivision 1 of section
663 of the Code of Civil Procedure.· On September 13th, the
trial court filed a written order denying the motion. Appellants filed on September 24th, a notice of appeal from the
judgment and on October 16th, a notice of appeal from the
order denying the motion to vacate the judgment. Respondent moves to dismiss the appeals on the grounds that (1) the
appeal from the judgment was taken too late and (2) the
order denying the motion to vacate under section 663 is not
an appealable order.
[1] 1. The appeal from the Judgment. Rule 3{b) of the
Rules on Appeal provides: "When a motion to vacate a judgment or to vacate a judgment and enter another and different
judgment is made by any party on any ground within 60 days
after entry of judgment, (1) if the motion is denied or not
decided by the superior court within 120 days after the entry
of the judgment, the time for filing the notice of appeal from
the judgment is extended for all parties until 30 days after
entry of the order denying the motion to vacate or 120 days
after entry of the judgment, whichever shan be less."
The 120th day after the entry of the judgment was August
26th. Under rule 3(b) an appeal from the judgment had to
be filed by that time, and the notice of appeal filed on September 24th was therefore too late. Appellants contend,
however, that the purpose of rule 3{b) was not to establish
an ultimate limit of 120 days from the entry of the judgment
within which an appeal might be taken but to grant 30 days
additional time from the denial of the motion however that
denial might occur. It is urged that the rule be read as granting an extension of 30 days after denial of the motion "Of'
ofter 120 days after entry of judgment. " The plain language
of the rule does not admit of such construction.
Rule 3(a), relating to extension of time to appeal from the
judgment when there has been a motion for new trial, provides: "When a valid notice of intention to move for a new
•• • A judgment or deeree, when baaed upon findings of faet made
by the eourt . • • may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set
aside and l"acated by the lIIlIle court and another and dilfcrent judgment entered, for either of the following causes .•.
"1. Incorreet or erroneous conclusions of law not ClOl1I!istent with
or not supported by the findings of fact; and in lIuch euae when the
judgment is set aside, the conclusions of law ahall be amended and
correeted. "

/
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trial is served and filed by any party within 60 days after
entry of judgment, (1) if the motion is denied, the time for
filing the notice of appeal from the judgment is extended for
all parties until 30 days after denial of the motion by order
of court or by operation of law." This rule accomplishes by
its express terms the result that appellants would reach by
their construction of rule 3 (b). It is reasonable to assume
that had the Judicial Council intended to accomplish that
result in section (b) of rule 3 it would have expressed that
intention as it did in section (a). The failure to do so indicates that this was not the intention of the council in adopting
rule 3 (b) as written.
It must be conceded that the operation of rule 3 (b) as it is
presently written may constitute a pitfall for the unwary.
Before the adoption of the rules, a motion to vacate the judgment under section 663 did not extend the time for appeal
from that judgment. Consequently, an appellant who wished
to preserve his right of appeal when the trial court did not
act on the motion had to invoke the slower and more costly
method of appeal from the judgment, even though in doing
so, he deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act on the
motion and to correct its own error. (Patch v. MiUer, 125
Cal. 240 {57 P. 986] ; Parkside Realty Co. v. MacDonald, 167
Cal. 342 [189 P. 805] ; Sacks v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.2d
537 {190 P.2d 602] ; Modoc Cooperative Assn. v. Porter, 11
Cal.App. 270 [104 P. 710] ; In re Shafter-Wasco Irrigation
District, 55 Cal.App.2d 484 [130 P.2d 755J.} It was sought,
in the adoption of rule 3, to eliminate the necessity for this
costly double-barrelled attack upon the judgment. Insofar
as motions for new trial are concerned, rule 3(a) accomplishes
that result. Rule 3(b), however, does not. "[W]here the
court fails to rule on the motion within 120 days after entry
of the judgment: the time to appeal is extended to 120 days
after entry of the judgment, the identical period. In other
words, the extension expires as soon as it beg41s and counsel
must therefore file notice of appeal before the end of the 120
days if the court does not act." (Witkin, New RuZes on
Appeal,17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 81, 98.) Although appellants choose
initially to avail themselves of the more inexpensive and expeditious method of asserting the defect, they must nevertheless
file their notice of appeal within 120 days after entry of judgment, if the court fails to rule on the motion before that time.
The rule should be amended so that future appellants will not
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experience the same difficulty.· Such amendment, hOwevtSr
must come from the Judicial Council, and cannot be accom.
plished by a strained construction of the plain language '-'
the rule.
' ~.
In Spotton v. Superior Covrl, 177 Oal. 719 [171 P. 801],
decided before the adoption of the Rules on Appeal, the:
court dismissed an appeal from the judgment taken more tbaD'\
60 days after entry thereof notwithstanding the pendp.]lcy o~
a motion under section 663, stating that the pendency of the
motion did not extend the time for appeal. This 60-day limi~
was extended to 120 days by rule 3 (b), but the time to appeal
from the judgment was not otherwise affected. Since appel:,
!ants, notwithstanding their pending motion for vacation of:
the judgment, failed to :file notice of appeal from the judgment·
within this extended time, the appeal from the judgment mUlt ,
be dismissed.
i
[I] 2. TA, app6lJl from fM d,nial of fA, mofion. This
operation of rule 3(b) does not, however, leave an appellant.
who has failed to take a timely appeal from the judgment .
completely remediless. Section 963 of the Code of Civil Pro- '.
eedure provides, in part, that an independent appeal may be
taken from ". . • any special order made after final judgment . • ." Respondent contends that the order in question
does not come within the section, but he cites no eases and
we have found none that supports this contention.
It will be noted that section 663a provides for an appeal
from an order granting such a motion, but is silent on the
subject of an appeal from an order of denial. Accordingly,
it might be contended that it was not intended to provide for
an appeal in such case, under the general rule that there can
be no appeal from an order of denial of a motion to vacate
when the same grounds are available on an appeal from the
judgment. It was so held in Modoc CooperatitJ, As",. v.
Port,,,, 11 Cal.App. 270 [104 P. 710), a case strongly relied
upon by respondent. The later decisions, however, have established the rule that an order of denial of a motion to vacate
under section 663 is appealable, notwithstanding that the
same grounds could be urged on an appeal from the judgment. (WinslO1O v. Harold a.Ferguson Corp., 25 Cal~

>

\
I

• Amending me 8 (b) to read: ". • • the time for filing the notice
of appeal from the judgment is extended for all partiea until 80 dall
after entry of the order denying the motion to vacate or 160 daya after
entry of the judgment, whichever is leaa" would eliminate the diJlieul·
tiea involved in the preaent rule and make the extension pattern COD'
8iatent with that embodied in rule 8(a).

I
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274 [153 P.2d 714]; Funk v. Oampbell, 15 Cal.2d250 [100
P.2d 762] ; Oalifornia Delta Farms, Inc. v. Ohinese-American
Farms, Inc., 201 Cal. 201 [255 P. 1097); Bond v. United Bailroads, 159 Cal. 270 [113 P. 366, Ann.Cas. 1912C 50, 48
L.R.A.N.S. 687]; Karlh v. Superior Oourt, 124 Cal.App. 373
[12 P.2d 658]; W"tef'tlelt v. McCullough, 64 Cal.App. 362
[221 P. 661] ; Potter v. Pigg, 35 Cal.App. 707 [170 P. 1066].)
[3] The denial of the motion herein was on September 13th,
and the notice of appeal, coming within 60 daya thereafter,
was timely and valid. (See Bounds v. Dippolito, .,., p. 59
[206 P.2d 1083].)
.
Eriat. of OOf'co'ftngas, 24 Cal.2d 517 [160 P.2d 194], and
Estate of O'Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [104 P.2d 368], relied upon by
respondent, do not support his contention. These eases were
decided under Probate Code, section 1240, which enumerates
. specifically what judgments and orders in probate matters
are appealable. That section has no application to appeals
from judgments or orders in ordinary civil proceedings, which
are controlled by Code of Civil Procedure, section 963.
The expiration of the 120-day limit terminated the extension of time within which an appeal could be taken from the
judgment under rule 3(b). It did not purport to deet the
power of the trial court to rule on the motion to vacate the
judgment, and the statutes prescribe no time limit within
which the power must be exercised. The formal order of
September 13th· denying the motion was, therefore, an order
of denial appealable as a special order after final judgment
under section 963.
[41 Finally, respondent urges that even though the order
is otherwise appealable, the appeal should be dismissed because
appellants failed to comply with section 663a in that their
notice of intention to move for an order vacating the judgment did not specify the time the motion would be made,
and because the motion was not made Qrally in open court
within 60 daya, under rule 8 (b). Appellants' reply brief
clearly discloses the reasons for failure to comply. It appears
that the trial judge was temporarily on duty in Los Angeles
County, from his home county of Lassen to which he returned
periodically, and it was not certain that he would be available
to hear the motion.. Accordingly, subsequent to the filing of
the notice of intention, all parties stipulated that they would
dispense with the oral presentation of the motion, and would
submit it to the trial judge on points and authorities. In view
of this stipulation, and the fact that the motion was in fact
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submitted to the trial judge in the stipulated manner wi . i
60 days, it must be held that there has been substantial com.;
pliance with these requirements. (Estate of Grivil, 208 cat
77,81 [280 P. 122].)
.•\,
The appeal from the judgment is dismissed. The motion _
dismiss the appeal from the order denying the motion to ~
cate the judgment is denied.
'
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., eoncurred.
CARTER, J .-1 dissent.
The only rational and fair interpretation of rule 3 (b) ,
the Rules on Appeal is that where the denial of a motion ..
vacate a judgment is not made within 120 days after the en "
of judgment, then the time to appeal is extended for 30 d~'
after the 120 days, making a total of 150 days.
.;~
The rule is fairly and reasonably susceptible of that eOn-;
struction. The whole purpose of it is to provide anextenrioft
of time to appeal where a motion to vacate a judgment is made:
No extension is achieved if the time within which the motion
may be passed upon and for taking an appeal expire simul-\
taneously. If the motion is denied or not decided within 120,
days, the time for filing notice of appeal is extended until
" 30 days afte,. entry of the order denying the motion . . . or'
120 days after entry of the judgment." Grammatically, the
clause "80 days after" modifies and is applicable to bo'h i
situations, a denial of the motion by the court and a failure.
to act within 120-days.
, ~:
That such construction should be placed upon the rule is'
clear to me. It is conceded by the majority that to construe;
it otherwise "constitutes a pitfall for the unwary." No rule'
or law should be given an interpretation having that result. ,,~
The injustice which may result from such an interpretation"
is further emphasized when we realize that it means that if the ~
court has not ruled on the 120th day, the notice of appeal,~
must be filed on the same day or the right to appeal is lost. "i'
But it would not be possible to file a notice of appeal on that :,'
day inasmuch as the day would have to end before it was ;
known whether a ruling would be made, and then it would be <"
too late to appeal. Suppose counsel does not have his office .
in the county seat. It may wen be physically impossible for,
him to get his notice of appeal filed in time,even if he was
notified during the 120th dav that his motion to vacate had
been denied.

Sept. 1949]
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The majority argue that since the rule 88 to extension of
time by new trial proceedings by "express terms" provides
for a maximum of 150 days within which an appeal may be
taken, and the rule on vacation of judgment proceedings contains no such express provision, it cannot be so construed.
This argument is squarely refuted by the following comments
of one of the draftsmen of the rules: "Under our former
statute, only new trial proceedings served to extend time to
appeal. In view of the general policy favoring applications
for relief in the trial court, the draftsman suggested that
motions made "nder 8ectitm 669 of the Code of Citlil Procedure, which are analogous and complemenf6ry fo flew trial
motions, shouZd likewise receive the benefits of the e~fen.riofl
provision. One objection, of course, W88 that the statute fixes
a time limit for deciding motions for new trial, but no such
limit is placed upon the other type of motion. Accordingly
the rule, 88 drafted, specifies a maximum period of 120 days
after entry of the judgment, in which the motion to vacate
must be made and decided, if the proceeding is to operate 88
an extension of time to appeal. This period cOf'f'esponds to
tke tntUimum possible "Mer fhe flew trial statute." (17 So.
Cal.L.Rev. 96.) The maximum time for appealing where
there are new trial proceedings is 150 Mys. (MeUin v. Tr01Udell, 33 Ca1.2d 858 [205 P.2d 1036].) To carry out the purpose, that is, to give tke same extension where there is a motion
to vacate a judgment, compels the conclusion that the maximum
should be 150 MY'. Correctly construed, therefore, the rule
provides for a period of 30 days after the 120 days which
would make a total of 150 days within which an appeal may
be taken after the entry of judgment where a motion is made
pursuant to the provisions of section 663 and denied on or
after the 120th day.
The interpretation placed by the majority upon rule 3 (b)
postulates an unjust reflection upon the able and eminent
jurists who constitute the Judicial Council of California and
the learned and able draftsman of said rule.
I would deny the motion to dismiss the appeal from the
judgment.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied October
13,1949.
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